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EAVESDROPPING PROVISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME
CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968: HOW DO
THEY STAND IN LIGHT OF RECENT SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS?
INTRODUCTION
In the Fourth Amendment the founding fathers wrote that people
had the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects."'
To protect this right, the Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."' In deciding the first wiretap case in 1928, the
Supreme Court held that the Amendment applied only to tangible matter
-the place, person or things to be seized.' Under this interpretation,
conversations were not constitutionally protected under the amendment.
Since 1928, however, the Court has taken a more liberal position as to
the protection afforded by the Fourth. In a series of cases, decided since
1966, the Court has formulated warrant requirements necessary for the
protection of conversations.' These requirements equate the protection
granted conversations to the protection given material things.
In its drive to curb crime, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.' Portions of this Act provide that
a court may authorize limited interception of electronic communications
if certain procedural requirements are met.6 For the most part these
procedures conform to the requirements laid down by the Supreme
Court. However, certain sections of the Act conflict with case law. It is
the purpose of this note to review the warrant requirements provided by
the Supreme Court and to evaluate the Crime Control Act with reference
to them.
CASE REQUIREMENTS
In Osborn v. United States,7 the Supreme Court upheld a con-
viction obtained with the aid of evidence secured by a tape recorder
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Id.
3. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
4. Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1968) ; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967) ; Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
5. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197 (June 19, 1968).
6. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2518, 82 Stat. 218 (June 19, 1968).
7. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
et al.: Eavesdropping Provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe St
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1968
90 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
concealed on a government informer. The defendant, an attorney, ap-
proached a member of the Nashville police force about the possibility of
bribing a juror. The officer reported this to agents of the United States
Department of Justice. The policeman then formalized his allegation in an
affidavit. Two federal judges authorized the use of a recorder to ascer-
tain the truthfulness of the affidavit by further conversations with the
attorney. This recording was admitted in evidence at a subsequent trial.8
The Court held that, under these facts, the use of the recording
device was permissible and the evidence was properly received. In so
holding, the Court stressed that the use of the device was authorized by
two federal judges in response to a detailed factual affidavit alleging
the commission of a specific criminal offense.9 Also pertinent was the fact
that the recorder was used for the narrow and particularized purpose of
obtaining evidence to ascertain the truth of the allegations contained in
the affidavit."' In defending its reasoning, the Court tersely stated:
[T]here could hardly be a clearer example of the "procedure
of antecedent justification before a magistrate that is central
to the Fourth Amendment" as "a precondition of lawful elec-
tronic surveilance."
In Berger v. New York," a New York statute1" authorized a
court to issue an order permitting electronic eavesdropping by a police
agency. The statute provided that upon the oath or affirmation of an
appropriate official, a judge could issue an ex parte order permitting
eavesdropping. The oath was required to state that evidence of a crime
may be obtained, and it had to describe the person whose communications
were to be intercepted. The order, once issued, could be valid for a period
of up to four months since the original two month order could be
renewed for an additional two months without a further showing of
probable cause. Using the statute as authority, a judge issued an order
permitting a "bugging" device to be installed in the office of a suspected
conspirator. A conviction was secured by using this surreptitiously
obtained evidence.
The United States Supreme Court held that the New York statute
failed to provide the necessary constitutional safeguards and reversed
the conviction. 4 The Court questioned, but did not dispute, whether the
8. Id. at 328, 329.
9. Id. at 330.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
13. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a (McKinney 1958) (repealed 1968).
14. 388 U.S. at 58.
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"reasonable ground" requirement of the statute was equivalent to the
"probable cause" required by the Fourth Amendment. 5 Rather, the
Court held that the limits of allowable interception were so vague that the
statute permitted a general search."8 There was no requirement that the
order describe the suspect, the offense or the communication to be seized.
The interception could continue up to four months without any require-
ment that the search stop when the desired communication was seized.
Furthermore, there was no requirement that a return be made showing
how the order was executed or what was seized. The Court then went on
to indicate that there must be a showing of exigent circumstances to
overcome the defect of lack of notice inherent in an eavesdrop order.
In Osborn, the Court had found that a court order authorizing eaves-
dropping was not inconsistent with the commands of the Fourth Amend-
ment when based on a particularized affidavit alleging a specific offense."
Building upon the foundation laid in Osborn, the Court in Berger then
amplified the requirements necessary to validate a court order authorizing
eavesdropping. The order must name the person whose communication
is to be seized, state the specific offense committed, particularly describe
the communication to be seized and provide that the search end when the
desired communication is seized.8 The order must also be executed with
dispatch and require a return showing how it was executed and what was
seized. Only by meeting these requirements could the order overcome
the taint of "general search," and the information seized be admissible
as evidence.
Justice Clark, in the Court's majority opinion, indicated the reasons
for the imposition of these warrant requirements when he stated:
The need for particularity and evidence of reliability in the
showing required when judicial authorization of a search is
sought is especially great in the case of eavesdropping. By its
very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that
is broad in scope. As was said in Osborn v. United States,
the "indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement
raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments," and imposes " a heavier responsibility on
this Court in its supervision of the fairness of procedures. .. "
In Katz v. United States"0 the Supreme Court overturned a con-
15. Id. at 55.
16. Id. at 58, 59.
17. 385 U.S. at 329.
18. 388 U.S. at 59, 60.
19. Id. at 56.
20. 88 S. Ct. 507 (1968).
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viction obtained with the aid of evidence secured by an eavesdropping
device fastened to the top of a telephone booth. No warrant had been
issued for the search. The government contended its search complied
with constitutional safeguards because there was adequate probable cause.
The interception did not begin until the petitioner's activities established
a strong probability that the telephone was being used to transmit
gambling information. The search was properly limited in both scope and
duration and the interception was limited to brief periods when the
petitioner used the phone. Also, communications of other parties were
not intercepted.
The Court held the search narrow enough so that a court, upon
a showing of probable cause, could have constitutionally authorized it.2"
The fatal defect, however, was that the search was not authorized by a
judge.22 The Court stated that no matter how carefully the police re-
strain themselves, the judiciary must interpose between the police and
the public before a valid interception can take place.2"
The Court in Katz affirmed the Osborn holding that a judicial
order may authorize eavesdropping to accomodate legitimate law en-
forcement needs. Katz held, however, that the search must be limited
both as to the conversations sought to be monitored and the period during
which such monitoring takes place. 4 Through these protections, the
Court continued, no greater intrusion than is necessary pierces the
privacy of an individual.
THE CRIME CONTROL ACT
A Presidential Commission found that organized criminals make
extensive use of wire and oral communications and indicated that in-
terception of these communications was vital to law enforcement.22
Accordingly, when Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 19682" (Crime Control Act), Title III included
provisions for specific procedures enabling law enforcement officials to
obtain judicial authorization for such interceptions.
Section 2516
Under this section of the Crime Control Act, the United States
Attorney General, or a specially designated assistant, may approve an
21. Id. at 513.
22. Id. at 514.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 513.
25. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE (1967).
26. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
82 Stat. 197 (June 19, 1968).
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application to a federal judge for an order authorizing electronic
interception." The order may be executed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or other federal investigating agency.2" Only when certain
offenses are alleged in the application may the order be issued to provide
interception. Among these offenses are violations of the Atomic Energy
Act, espionage, sabotage, treason, and activities of organized crime.2"
Similarly, a state Attorney General or principal prosecuting officer of a
state political subdivision, if authorized by state statute, may make an
application to a state judge for an intercept order."0 A state order may
be authorized when the commission of a felony is alleged."
Section 2517
Communications intercepted under a valid order may be disclosed
to other investigative officers to the extent necessary for the proper
performance of either the disclosing or receiving officer's duties.2
27. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2516(1), 82 Stat. 216 (June 19, 1968), amending 18
U.S.C. 802 (1948).
(1) The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially
designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal
judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in conformity
with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving the
interception of wire or oral communications by the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, or a Federal agency having responsibility for the investigation of the
offense as to which the application is made, when such interception may
provide or has provided evidence of....
28. Id.
29. Id. at § 2516(1)(a)-(1)(g).
30. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2516(2), 82 Stat. 217 (June 19, 1968), amending 18
U.S.C. 802 (1948).
(2) The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal
prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney is
authorized by a statute of that State to make application to a State court
judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or approving the
interception of wire or oral communications, may apply to such judge for, and
such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter and
with the applicable State statute an order authorizing, or approving the
interception of wire or oral communications by investigative law enforcement
officers having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which
the application is made, when such interception may provide or has provided
evidence of the commission of the offense of murder, kidnapping, gambling,
robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana or other
dangerous drugs, or other crime dangerous to life, limb, or property, and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, designated in any
applicable State statute authorizing such interception, or any conspiracy to
commit any of the foregoing offenses.
31. Id.
32. Id. at § 2517(1), (2).
(1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any
wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such
contents to another investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent
that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official
duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure.
et al.: Eavesdropping Provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe St
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Information intercepted may also be disclosed to either a state or federal
criminal proceeding or grand jury." However, a privileged communica-
tion intercepted under a valid order does not loose its privileged
character."
If information relating to an offense not specified in the intercept
order is obtained, it may be disclosed to other officers and may be used
as evidence upon judicial determination that the interception was other-
wise made in accordance with the order.8 5 This provision seems to extend
the scope of the interception beyond the limits set out by the Supreme
Court in case law. The Court in Katz, Berger and Osborn stressed the
need for specifying the offense for which the order is sought. The Crime
Control Act permits the executing officer, rather than the court, to
determine what will be seized. While a judge must determine that the
information was intercepted in accordance with the provisions of the Act,
it may be questioned whether the Supreme Court would find subsequent
judicial approval equivalent to the procedure of antecedent justification
necessary under the Fourth Amendment."
Section 2518
This section provides that an application for an order authorizing
or approving interception of oral or wire communications may be made
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, who, by any means
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any
wire or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom may use such
contents to the extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his
official duties.
33. Id. at § 2517(3).
(3) Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this
chapter, any information concerning a wire or oral communication, or evidence
derived therefrom intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter
may disclose the contents of that communication or such derivative evidence
while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any criminal proceeding
in any court of the United States or of any State or in any Federal or
State grand jury proceeding.
34. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2517(4), 82 Stat. 218 (June 19, 1968), amending 18
U.S.C. 802 (1948).
(4) No otherwise privileged wire or oral communication intercepted in
accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall
lose its privileged character.
35. Id. at § 2517(5).
(5) When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in
intercepting wire or oral communications in the manner authorized herein,
intercepts wire or oral communications relating to offenses other than those
specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents thereof, and
evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed or used as provided in subsections
(1) and (2) of this section. Such contents and any evidence derived therefrom
may be used under subsection (3) of this section when authorized or approved
by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent
application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter. Such application shall be made as soon as practicable.
36. See note 11 infra.
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in writing to a judge of competent jurisdiction." The application must
identify the officer making and approving the application."8 The applica-
tion must also state details of the offense that has been or is about to be
committed; a description of the facilities from which the interception is to
take place; description of the type of commuincation to be intercepted;
and the identity of the, person, if known, whose communications are to
be intercepted. 9 The length of time the interception will continue must
be specified." There must be a showing that other investigative proce-
dures have been tried and failed, or would probably fail or be too
dangerous."' The court must be informed if other interceptions involving
the same individuals or facilities have taken place. 2 The issuing judge
may require the applicant to furnish additional evidence in support of the
application."
37. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2518(1), 82 Stat. 218 (June 19, 1968), amending 18
U.S.C. 802 (1948).
(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the intercep-
tion of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath
or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state the
applicant's authority to make such application. Each application shall include
the following information....
38. Id. at § 2518(1) (a).
(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
the application, and the officer authorizing the application ...
39. Id.at§2518(1)(b).
(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued,
including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is
about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of
the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be inter-
cepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communications sought to be
intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and
whose communications are to be intercepted ...
40. Id. at § 2518(1) (d).
(d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such that the
authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the
described type of communication has been first obtained, a particular descrip-
tion of facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communica-
tions of the same type will occur thereafter ...
41. Id. at § 2518(1) (c).
(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investiga-
tive procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to
be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. ...
42. Id. at § 2518(1) (e).
(e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications known to the individual authorizing and making the application,
made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval of inter-
ceptions of, wire or oral communications involving any of the same persons,
facilities or places specified in the application, and the action taken by the
judge on each application. . ..
43. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2518(2), 82 Stat. 219 (June 19, 1968), amending 18
U.S.C. 802 (1948).
(2) The judge may require the applicant to furnish additional testimony
et al.: Eavesdropping Provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe St
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The judge may issue an ex parte order authorizing or approving
interception of oral or wire communications if he finds sufficient probable
cause. 4 ' Under the Act, probable cause includes finding that the enumer-
ated offense has been committed;4 that communications relating to the
offense will be obtained through the interception ;4' and that the com-
munications will be intercepted from facilities specified in the applica-
tion.4 ' The judge must also determine that other investigative measures
have been tried and failed, would fail or would be too dangerous. 8
The order authorizing or approving interception must specify the
identity of the person whose communication is to be intercepted ;49
the facilities from which the interception is to take place ;5o a particular
description of the type of communication to be intercepted and the
particular offense to which it relates;"' the identity of the agency
authorized to make the interception;5" and the length of time for which
the interception is authorized.5"
or documentary evidence in support of the application.
44. Id. at § 2518(3).
(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, as
requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire or
oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which
the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted
by the applicant that. . . .
45. Id. at § 2518(3) (a).
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in
section 2516 of this chapter....
46. Id. at § 2518(3) (b).
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception....
47. Id. at § 2518(3)(d).
(d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which,
or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted
are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission
of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by
such person.
48. Id. at § 2518(3) (c).
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous....
49. Id. at § 2518(4) (a).
(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire or
oral communication shall specify-
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications
are to be intercepted. ...
50. Id. at § 2518(4) (b).
(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted. ...
51. Id. at § 2518(4) (c).
(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be
intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates. ...
52. Id. at § 2518(4) (d).
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications,
and of the person authorizing the application. ...
53. Id. at § 2518(4) (e).
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The Act appears to meet the particularized requirements of a valid
interception of communications based on probable cause as laid down by
the Supreme Court, with one exception. The Act provides that the order
must particularly describe the "type of communication" 54 to be seized.
In Berger, the Court stated that the order must "particularly describ[e]
the communication, conversation or discussions to be seized."55 It may
be questioned whether the Court will find that describing the "type" of
communication is equivalent to a requirement that the order "particularly
describ[e]" the communication. However, the Court's requirement in
Berger may ask too much. Concerning Berger, Justice Black in his
dissent to Katz said:
Yet the Court's interpretation would have the Amendment
apply to overhearing future conversations which by their very
nature are nonexistent until they take place. How can one
"describe" a future conversation, and if not, how can a magis-
trate issue a warrant to eavesdrop one in the future ?"6
The Court in Katz did not mention this requirement, and in failing to do
so may have relaxed its position on this point. If so, the Crime Control
Act's entire particularization requirement should meet the Court's ap-
proval.
The Court in Katz did not mention this requirement and in failing to do
because it failed to require a showing of exigent circumstances to over-
come the lack of notice inherent in an eavesdrop order. 7 In neither
Katz nor Osborne did the Court require a special showing to overcome
this defect. The Court in Katz cited Ker v. California" to support the
proposition that the notice requirement of a warrant may be omitted if it
would enable a suspect to escape or evidence to be destroyed. The Crime
Control Act, however, requires a showing that other investigative means
have been tried and failed, or would fail or be too dangerous." In the
light of Katz and Ker, this showing is probably sufficient to overcome the
defect of lack of notice.
No order may be authorized for any period longer than that
(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized,
including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically
terminate when the described communication has been first obtained.
54. Id. at § 2518(4) (c).
55. 388 U.S. at 59.
56. 88 S. Ct. at 519.
57. 388 U.S. at 60.
58. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1962).
59. 88 S. Ct. at 513 n.16.
60. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2518(1)(c), 82 Stat. 218; § 2518(3) (c), 82 Stat. 219
(June 19, 1968), amending 18 U.S.C. 802 (1968).
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necessary to intercept the described conversation with the maximum
period being thirty days.6' If the intercept is not to end when the
desired communication is seized, probable cause must be shown that
communications of the same type will subsequently occur. 2 If the com-
munication is not obtained within the original period, an extension may
be requested, supported by a showing of probable cause and a reasonable
explanation for the failure to achieve results.6" In addition, the issuing
judge may require periodic reports of the progress made toward achieving
the authorized objective.64 In Berger, the Court held that the New York
statute permitted general searches and was therefore unconstitutional, one
of the controlling reasons being that searches could be continued for
periods of up to 120 days.6 Since the Crime Control Act does not
permit a search to continue for a longer period than can be supported by
probable cause and it permits the issuing court to supervise the search in
progress, it is submitted that the searches permitted by the Act cannot be
termed "general," and are therefore constitutional.
The Court in Katz, Berger and Osborn stated that an eavesdrop
order must provide for a return showing what was seized.66 If a return
were not required, the executing officer would have full discretion as to
the disposition of seized conversations of both suspected and innocent
61. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2518(5), 82 Stat. 219.
(5) No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the
interception of any wire or oral communication for any period longer than
is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event
longer than thirty days. Extensions of an order may be granted, but only
upon application for an extension made in accordance with subsection (1) of
this section and the court making the findings required by subsection (3)
of this section. The period of extension shall be no longer than the authorizing
judge deems necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was granted and
in no event for longer than thirty days. Every order and extension thereof
shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed
as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under
this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective,
or in any event in thirty days.
62. Id. at § 2518(1) (d). For text see note 40 supra.
63. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2518(1) (f), 82 Stat. 218 (June 19, 1968), amending
18 U.S.C. 802 (1948).
(f) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement
setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable
explanation of the failure to obtain such results.
64. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2518(6), 82 Stat. 220 (June 19, 1968), amending 18
U.S.C. 802 (1968).
(6) Whenever an order authorizing interception is entered pursuant to
this chapter, the order may require reports to be made to the judge who
issued the order showing what progress has been made toward achievement of
the authorized objective and the need for continued interception. Such reports
shall be made at such intervals as the judge may require.
65. 388 U.S. at 59.
66. Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1968).
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parties. The Act, however, does not provide for a return showing how the
order was executed as the Court has required. While this defect may be
cured by adhering to the procedures of rule 41 (d) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 7 the Act itself does not so direct. Whether
this would be sufficient is for the Supreme Court to ultimately decide.
Also, the Crime Control Act directs that the order shall be executed
''as soon as practicable" and in such a manner as to minimize the
interception of communication of innocent parties. 8 Communications
intercepted shall, if possible, be recorded and custody of the recordings
shall be the responsibility of the issuing judge. 9 Thus, while the Crime
Control Act provides for the disposition of recorded interceptions, it is
silent as to the procedures to be followed by the executing offficer when
no recordings are made.
The Act provides that in emergency situations, involving national
security or organized crime, interceptions of oral or wire communications
may be made without judicial authorization.0 These interceptions may
67. FED. RULES CRIM. PROC. 41(d), 18 U.S.C. (1940).
68. See note 64 infra.
69. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2518(8), 82 Stat. 220 (June 19, 1968), amending 18
U.S.C. 802 (1968). This section, in part, states:
(8) (a) The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by
any means authorized by this chapter shall, if possible, be recorded on tape
or wire or other comparable device. The recording of the contents of any
wire or oral communication under this subsection shall be done in such way
as will protect the recording from editing or other alterations. Immediately
upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such
recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed
under his directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge
orders....
70. Id. at § 2518(7)(a). Section (7) provides:
(7) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any investigative
or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the Attorney General or
by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof
acting pursuant to a statute of that State, who reasonably determines that-
(a) an emergency situation exists with respect to conspiratorial
activities threatening the national security interest or to conspiratorial
activities characteristic of organized crime that requires a wire or oral
communication to be intercepted before an order authorizing such
interception can with due diligence be obtained, and
(b) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered under
this chapter to authorize such interception,
may intercept such wire or oral communication if an application for an order
approving the interception is made in accordance with this section within
forty-eight hours after the interception has occurred, or begins to occur.
In the absence of an order, such interception shall immediately terminate when
the communication sought is obtained or when the application for the order is
denied, whichever is earlier. In the event such application for approval is
denied, or in any other case where the interception is terminated without an
order having been issued, the contents of any wire or oral communication
intercepted shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this chapter,
and an inventory shall be served as provided for in subsection (d) of this
section on the person named in the application.
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be carried out by any officer specially designated by the United States
Attorney General or the principal prosecuting officer of the state or
political subdivision."' An application for an order approving the inter-
ception must be made to a judge of competent jurisdiction within forty-
eight hours after the interception has begun."
It is submitted that this provision is unconstitutional. Allowing any
search to proceed without judicial authorization, even for forty-eight
hours, seems to expressly violate the Fourth Amendment.
"Over and again this Court has emphasized that the man-
date of the Fourth Amendment requires adherence to judicial
process" and that searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."3
In his concurring opinion to Katz, Justice White proposed that the
warrant procedures of the Fourth should be relaxed if the President or
Attorney General authorized electronic interception in cases involving the
national security interest. 4 Justice Douglas replied to Justice White by
stating:
Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I
cannot agree that where spies and saboteurs are involved ade-
quate protection of Fourth Amendment rights is assured when
the President and Attorney General assume both the position
of adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magis-
trate.73
In light of these statements, it is submitted that the Court would not
allow "any investigative or law enforcement officer" to act as neutral
judge, even for forty-eight hours and under the most pressing circum-
stances, and the Court may well declare this provision unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Both Congress and the United States Supreme Court have recog-
nized that modern electronic eavesdropping techniques may threaten the
privacy of every citizen. By interpreting the Fourth Amendment to
include conversations, Congress and the Supreme Court have provided
71. Id. at § 2518(7).
72. Id.
73. Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1968).
74. Id. at 518.
75. Id. at 516.
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our citizens with protection against this threat. At the same time, by
laying down the requirements for a valid warrant, they have provided law
enforcement officials with necessary and powerful means by which to
obtain evidence for cirminal prosecution. However, in its willingness to
give law enforcement as much assistance as possible, Congress, in some
provisions of the Crime Control Act, seems to have infringed upon the
protection afforded citizens by the Fourth Amendment. As a result, it is
submitted, these infringements may be unconstitutional, and if the
Supreme Court deems these infringements not severable, the entire act
may fail."8
76. Although the Act contains a separability clause (Title XI), presumption of
separability may be overcome if it is felt the legislative intent would not be fulfilled by
the deletion. Williams v. Standard Oil Company, 278 U.S. 235 (1928).
Speaking of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, former
Justice Arthur J. Goldberg said: "This law, along with much needed measures to
strengthen law enforcement, contains in Titles II and III provisions which are . . . of
dubious constitutionality." A. Goldberg, Criminal Justice in Times of Stress, 52
J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 54 (1968).
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